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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
FLOW-CONTROL: THE PROBLEMS OF
REGULATING THE IMPORTATION OF
SOLID WASTE
NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT

AssociATION V.MEYER'
by Rebecco Tenbrook

1. INRODUCTION

discuss why efforts toward regulation have
failed inother states and why Wisconsin's
attempt was also unsuccessful. In addition, this casenote will also advance a
perspective on the topic that differs from
the traditional approach of regulating the
flow of waste into states, namely, control
over the flow of waste into landfills. Furthermore, it will propose a regulatory and
enforcement plan that may have a better
chance of surviving a constitutional
challenge.

Waste disposal is a monumental problem in this country.2 Every year, more and
more waste is produced and as landfill
space is exhausted, states are forced to
open new ones or find ways to decrease
the flow of waste into current landfills. To
address this problem, several states have
enacted statutes that forbid, tax, or
charge out-of-stlate waste entering a state's
landfills. These statutes, however, have
been struck down by the courts as violative of the Commerce Clause. National
Solid Wastes Management Association v. 11.FACTS AND HOLDING
National Solid Wastes Management
Meyer was Wisconsin's attempt to craft a
(NSWMA), together with
Association,
waste control measure which would surother
waste management and
various
vive judicial review. This casenote will

sanitation companies, filed this action to
contest a Wisconsin state low which
regulated solid waste entering Wisconsin
landfills.? The plaintiffs contended that the
Wisconsin statute violated the Commerce
Clause4 of the United States Constitution
and that they were entitled to relief under
42 U.S.C § 1983.5
The statute in question required that
eleven recyclable materials be recovered
from commercial and residential waste
before such waste was dumped in Wisconsin landfills.6 The plaintiff's objected
to the requirement that, for any waste
hauler to use the landfill, everyone in the
community to which the hauler belonged
must follow Wisconsin's recycling requirements. 7 These requirements, applied even
if that hauler does not reside in Wisconsin
and if the other members of the community
in which it did reside did not use Wisconsin landfills.' The plaintiffs argued that the
statute violated the Commerce Clause because it regulated commerce occurring
wholly outside Wisconsin." They also argued that the statute was discriminatory
on its face and in practical effect, since it
treated similar products from different
points of origin differently.'o For these
reasons, plaintiffs contended the statute
should be given strict scrutiny."
Defendants argued that the statute was
not discriminatory and, therefore, should
be evaluated using a balancing opproach.' 2 They further contended that the
interests of the State of Wisconsin in managing the use of its landfills outweighed
the burdens that the statute placed on

I

63 F.3d 652 17th Or. 1995), petition for ce. denied, 116 S.O. 1351 (U.S. April 1, 1996).
See Fort Grotiol Sonitary Landlill, Inc. v.Michigan Dep' of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 368-69 (1992) (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (citing United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the Untied States: 1990 Update 10).
3 National Solid Wstes Management Assn, 63 F.3d at 653. See Wis. SAt. §§ 159.07-.1 1(Supp. 1995).
4 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 63 F.3d at 656.
5 Id.
2

6

Id at 654.

- Id.at 654-655. The statute required communities wishing to use Wisconsin landfills to: collect, process, and market the eleven named solid wastes; prohibit the
entry of the eleven solid wastes into its landfills; adhere to Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources' rules on the collection and disposal of the solid wastes; take
adequate steps to enforce recycling regulations, acquire the equipment to implement recycling measures; and "make a reasonable efforr to reduce the volume of the
eleven colid wastes produced. Wis. SAi. §§ 159.07(3), .11
I National Solid Wastes Management Assn, 63 F.3d at 655.
9
to

Id. at 656.
Id.

n

;d

12 Id. at 658.
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commerce."
The district court agreed
with the defendants, finding that the statute was neither facially discriminatory nor
discriminatory in effect.14 In addition, the
court found the burden on commerce to
be slight compared to the benefits, which
included conservation of landfill capacity
and environmental protection.'s
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding:
the practical effect of the Wisconsin statute was to control commercial conduct
wholly outside the State of Wisconsin; the
statute discriminated against out-of-state
waste haulers; and the Wisconsin plan
overburdened interstate commerce when
the requirements were balanced against
state interests. 16

III. LEGAL HISTORY
A.

The Commerce Clause - The

Basics
The Commerce Clause gives Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce,
seemingly for the purpose of assuring free
trade between the states.17 Generally,
when the Constitution grants regulatory
powers to Congress and Congress does
not exercise those powers, the states are
not constrained by the mere existence of
the possibility that Congress might regulate their conduct. In other words, where
Congress is silent, the states are free to
act. However, in certain discrete instances, the Supreme Court has struck
S

down state regulatory actions which interfere with the apparent purpose of a Constitutional provision.
One of these
instances is the so-called dormant Commerce Clause doctrine." This doctrine
severely limits state action which interferes
with the free-trade of interstate commerce.' 9 The dormant Commerce Clause,
at times, is in direct conflict with various
states' rights to decide how best to utilize
their natural resources and ensure the
health and safety of their citizens.20 The
Court has addressed this tension by allowing impediments to free trade only when
the regulations, if facially discriminatory,
survive strict scrutiny, or, when not facially
discriminatory, do not unduly burden interstate commerce. 2' This leaves only a few
limited areas in which states can regulate
interstate commerce: protection of health
or safety;22 subsidies;23 compensatory
taxes;24 market participation; 25 and nondiscriminatory regulation of commerce.
Protectionism involves a state's power
to regulate commerce to protect the health
and safety of its citizens at the expense of
interstate commerce. These regulations
are facially discriminatory or discriminatory in effect and as such, are subject to
strict scrutiny. For such a regulation to survive, the state must prove that its interest is
substantial, that interstate commerce is the
cause of the problem the regulations are
designed to correct, and that there is no

non-discriminotory correction method
available.26 For example, laws which
limit or forbid the importation of potentially
dangerous materials (quarantine laws) are
not violative of the dormant Commerce
Clause because they serve the interests of
health and safety and not a desire to
promulgate economic protectionism. The
basic defense of a quarantine law is that
there is something different about a regulated import that makes it more dangerous
than domestic products of the some
type.2 7
The flip side of health and safety protectionism is the regulation of exports for
health and safety reasons which is also
allowed, but with different restrictions. 8
The regulations must be designed to protect the citizenry and the regulations must
be the some for in-state and out-of-state
users. 29 These types of regulations are
subject to a balancing test rather than to
strict scrutiny, since they are not discriminatory but may impose an undue burden
on interstate commerce. 0 Under the test

diagrammed in Pike v. Bruce Church,"
courts will weigh the substantiality of the
interest the state seeks to protect against
the magnitude of the burden the state
places on interstate commerce.
The courts also review discrimination
in favor of domestic interests using the Pike
balancing test when the state is involved
in a transaction as a market participator.

d. at 656.

14 Id.
15 Id.
SId.at

66063.
17 U.S. Const. or. 1,§ 8, cl. 3.
8 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (19871.
19 See Fort Graiot Sanitary landill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep's of Nolural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359119921.
a Id. See olso C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1682 11994).
21 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S., 573, 579 (19861 (discussing facially discriminatory state statutes). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 11970)
(discussing facially neutral state statutes).
22 See C&A Carbone, 114 S.Ci. of 1687.
" Id.
2
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346 n.9 (19921
* See Philadelphia v. NewJesey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1979). See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
26 This is the traditional "compelling interest and least restrictive means" tes demanded by stric scrutiny. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617.
' Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S., 131 (19861 (allowing a prohibition against import of bailish infected with a parasite that was dangerous to Maine ecosystems).
23 Spohose-v Nebrska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
" Id.a 955-56. This case involved a regulation on groundwater exports and stated, 'jo]bviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its
own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State." Id.
' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 13711970).
3'
Id.
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When the stole enters into a commercial
transaction or operates a business, it can
conduct its business as it pleases. 32 if it
wishes to do business solely with its own
citizens, that is the state's prerogative. In
these cases, the state con only regulate
the market in which it is participating, and
only the conduct of the parties to the tronsaction.
It cannot creole a monopoly,
nor can it exercise control over a substanlial portion of a natural resource.
A state also can provide its citizens an
advantage over out-of-state competitors
without violating the Commerce Clause if
its actions do not serve to regulate commerce. For example, states can provide
subsides to their citizens, but not to nonresident competitors.35 This type of state
action does not violate the Commerce
Clause because it does nothing to impede
the free flow of interstate commerce. Similarly, states can seek to even the playing
field through compensatory taxes. A compensatory tax is designed to assess the
costs of a state funded service which citizens pay through general revenues to outof-state users.3
Furthermore, states retain the power to
regulate intrastate commerce. Ifthe effects
of regulations on intrastate commerce spill
3

Hughes, 426 U.S. at 809-10.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439(19801.

34

Id.

over onto interstate commerce, the courts
review them using the some two-tier approach discussed above. Ifthe regulation
is facially discriminatory or discriminatory
in effect against out-of-state economic interests, it will receive strict scrutiny.37 If
in-state entrepreneurs are treated in the
some way as out-of-state ones, the court
will apply the balancing test and the regulation will stand if the state interest outweighs the burden on interstate
commerce. 38
On the other hand, the dormant Commerce Clause denies states the ability to
regulate imports which are not distinct
from domestic products when they do not
regulate their own products,39 to impose a
greater burden on imports than that on
domestic products for no other reason
than that they are imports,40 to condition
imports or exports on a sister state's
agreement to reciprocate in kind,' and to
regulate, either directly or in effect, conduct which occurs wholly outside the
state.42

without success.
New Jersey4 3 AlobamaA Oregon,s and Michigan, 6
among others, have all taken different
tacks on this issue and have come away
from the courthouse defeated.
1. NewJersey
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,' the
first case involving solid waste disposal
considered by the United States Supreme
Court, the state of New Jersey cited health
and safety reasons for its ban on the importation of most solid wastes for disposal
in the state's landfills.48 The court, however, was suspicious that New Jersey's
regulations amounted to economic prolec-

lionism. Although the purpose of the New
Jersey low was not to gain a competitive
edge for its citizens in the waste disposal
business, the effect, the legislative means,
was protectionist and therefore disollowed.4 ' The court stated that legislation
that stops interstate commerce at the border is the "clearest example" of economic
protectionism, and virtually per se invalid.50 It went on to say that the determinB. Regulation Of Solid Waste - ing element in deciding whether a statute
amounts to economic protectionism "is the
What Has Not Worked
Wisconsin is not the first state to try to attempt by one State to isolate itself from a
regulate waste flow into its landfills problem common to many by erecting a

* New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269(1988).
3 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envil. Quality of State of Or., 114 S. Ci 1345, 1351 (1994).
1' Id. at 1350
3S Id.

"

Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.

40 Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ci. of 1350.
' Spothose, 458 U.S. o0944.

4

Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989).

a Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617.
Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. 334; National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alaboma Dep't Envil. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990).
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 1345.
46 Fort Graliot Sanitary landil, 504 U.S. at 353.
4 Philadelphia. 437 U.S. at 617.
40 NewJersey low states in pertinent part:
No person shall bring into this Stoe any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be
fed to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the State Department of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action can be
permitted without endangering the public health, safety, and welfare and has promulgated regulations permilling and regulation the treatment and disposal of
such waste in this State.
Id.at 618, quoting NJ. SAt Am. §13:11-10 (West Supp. 19781. In accordance with this regulation, the commissioner then established four categories of waste which
would not be prohibited under the statute: swine feed, separated recyclobles, recovered potential resources, and noxious wastes headed for treatment facilities. Philadel
phla, 437 U.S. at 624.
49 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
S Id
"
4

MELPR

159

Vol. 3 * No. 3
barrier against the movement of interstate
trade."-' The court qualified this hardline
statement, however, leaving open the possibility of a regulation which is not potently discriminatory or which serves a
compelling state interest.s2 These are the
Pike balancing test and quarantine
exceptions.
Although the Philadelphia court rejected the application of both exceptions,
it offered guidelines for when the exceptions would apply. In order to survive the
Pike balancing test, a legislative act must
not be discriminatory on its face or in
practical effect. In addition, the act may
impose only an incidental burden on interstate commerce and must also advance a
legitimate local concern.
The quarantine exception can only be
invoked when laws seek to discriminate
against out-of-state products not because
they come from out-of-state, but because
they are noxious or dangerous. The court
refused to apply this exception to the New
Jersey low because, it stated, "[tihe harms
caused by waste are said to arise after its
disposal in landfill sites, and at that point,
. . . there is no basis to distinguish out-ofstate waste from domestic waste. Ifone is
inherently harmful, so is the other.""

hazardous waste management facilities
from accepting hazardous materials from
out-of-state if the state in question prohibited disposal of hazardous waste within
its borders and had no facility for such, or
if it had no facility and had not entered
into an agreement for disposal of hazardous wastes which the state of Alabama
had signed."'

Alabama advanced three arguments
for the constitutionality of the Holley bill.
The first two, the Pike balancing test and
quarantine exception, both failed. The
third was a Congressional authorization
argument. Alabama argued that Congress, through the requirements of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA)56 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA),s7 imposed on the
states an obligation to regulate the movement and disposal of hazardous wastes
within their respective borders. The court
disagreed. It stated that for Congress to
give to the states the power of regulating
or burdening interstate commerce, this
grant must be "expressly stated" and
"unmistakably clear.""'
The court did
not find that level of certainty met here.
SARA, for example, required the generating state to conform with factual
2. Alabama
requirements to assure on adequate landThe next attempt of regulation came fill capacity and held the state liable for
out of Alabama in the form of the Holley any infraction.5 The court did not permit
Bill." The Holley Bill prohibited private this arrangement to be translated into a
'

grant of power that allowed receiving
states to compel adherence to federal requirements by denying non-qualifying generating states access to its management

facilities.60
Two years later Alabama tried again
by imposing a "cop" on the yearly
amount of hazardous waste that could be
disposed of at a site, in addition to a twotiered fee system. 6' The fee systems consisted of a flat per-ton fee paid by the operator of the facility and an additional fee
assessed against waste generated out-ofstate.62 This was quite a departure from
the outright banning of entry of out-of-state
waste the courts had previously struck
down, and the cap and base fee survived
review. Only the additional fee was an
object of contention in this case. The
court again disallowed it, calling the statute facially discriminatory and overly burdensome.
Although Alabama argued
that the additional fee worked to advance
legitimate state concerns,"A the court concluded that, except for its point of origin,
imported waste was indistinguishable
from domestic waste and as such resulted
in discriminatory treatment.65 The court
further reasoned that the additional fee
did not constitute the least restrictive
means of protecting Alabama's interest as
required to prevent regulations from being
found facially discriminatory.?

Id. t 628.

Id. at 628-29.
Id.at 629.
SAtA. CoDE § 22-3011 11989).
* Id.
* Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L.No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at Section 104(c1l9), 42 U.S.C. § 9 604(c)19)).
* Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liability Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 [1982 & Supp. V 1987).
so National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama, 910 F.2dat 721 (citing SouthCeniral Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 9011984) lather
cifolions omitted).
9 Id.
m Id. "Although Congress may override the commerce clause by express statutory language, it has not done so in enacting CERCIA" (quoting Alabama v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3).
8
Aw. CODE § 22-30b-2(o) (Supp. 1991).
6
Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. of 338. See also Ai.CODE § 22-30B-2(al (Supp. 1991): "For waste and substances which are generated outside of
Alabama and disposed of at a commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste of hazardous substances inAlabama, on additional fee shall be levied at the role of
$72.00 perton."
-Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 342.
* Id. at 343. The Alabama Supreme Court enumerated these concems In its decision as: health and safety- environmental protection; compensatory revenue; and
waste flow control. kI., (citing Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 584 So.2d 1367, 1388-89 (199111.
65 Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 344.
s
*
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3. Michigan
On the same day, the Supreme Court
struck down Michigan's efforts in this
orena. Instead of attempting to regulate
the flow of commerce at the border of the
state, Michigan's Solid Waste Management Act ("SWMA")6 7 required each
county within the state to develop and implement waste reduction programs that
comported with state health standards.
This included a prohibition against accepting waste generated out-of-county
without Michigan's express permission. 8
Michigan argued that the SWMA differed from the law struck down in Philadephio because it impeded in-state, but
out-ocounty waste, and outof-state waste
equally."
The court rejected this argument, stating that the existence of an
equal burden on citizens of the state did
not eliminate the discrimination, it only
lessened its effect. 70
Michigan fell back on the health and
safety regulation argument. This foiled, as
it had in cases before because Michigan
was not able to prove that SWMA served
valid health and safety goals. 1

Oregon statute called for a fee of $.85
per ton on domestic waste and $2.25
The
per ton on imported waste. 2
purported reasons for the discrepancy
were the disparate impact of the costs of
disposal on citizens versus non-citizens
and an effort to force out-of-state users to
"pay their fair share."" Although a legitimate state interest existed, the court found
the regulation facially discriminatory and
as a result struck down the regulation.7'
The court found no basis for the assertion that out-of-state waste is more expensive to dispose of or process than in-state
waste.75 Nor did it think that Oregon
had successfully identified the intrastate
burden the tax purportedly compensated
for or the approximate cost of that burden.76 The lack of these two elements of
a compensatory tax proved fatal to Oregon's claim.

facility other than the county's designated
facility. 9 The counties were, in theory,
free to contract with anyone they chose,
and in that way, were participants in the
market. However, the court found that the
DER regulations acted as a constraint on
the county's ability to contract because the
contracts could only be made pursuant to
the regulations.o The court held that the
state was acting to compel the terms of
the contract and crafting the circumstances under which the counties could
contract. Pennsylvania, therefore, was
acting to regulate the market and was not
acting as a market participator. 1
In sum, states have not succeeded in
slowing the flow of waste into their landfills by enacting regulations that burden
interstate commerce. Thus for, health and
safety protection, quarantine, the Pike test,
congressional authorization, compensatory tax, and market participant doctrines
have all failed as defenses to such doc5. Pennsylvania
Finally, Pennsylvania tried to use the trines. As a result, Wisconsin, and those
market participant exception to the dor- who follow, must find other approaches to
mant Commerce Clouse to survive judicial this problem.
review. 7 The Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources ("DER") required IV. INSTANT DECISION
4. Oregon
that each county designate a waste facilIn the instant case, the court examined
In 1994, Oregon's regulation, which ity and contract with that facility for dis- a Wisconsin statute that required out-ofmandated a compensatory tax on waste, posal of all of the county's waste.78 It state communities to implement Wisconsinwas reviewed by the Supreme Court. The also made it illegal to dump waste in any like recycling programs in order to utilize

I Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 345. The court offered Alabama two alternatives to the additional fee that would not violate the consitution: taxing
citizen and non-citizen vehicles transporting waste by the mile, and a cop on the total waste allowed in its landfills. Id. Alabama had already enacted a tonnage limit in
ihe portion of the statute Ihat was upheld. But, asJustice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, requiring an evenhanded 1ox on transportation would serve to impose two
to:e: on citizens, as compared to only one tax on alien. Citizens would be required to pay for inspection and regulation of waste management out of general tax
revenues as well as a tax aimed a transport, while the only burden placed on non-citizens would be the transport tax. Id.(RehnquistiJ., dissenting).
67 The statute was enacted as Mic. Comp. t.Aws AmN.§§ 299.401-.437 (West 1978). See Fort Gratiot Sanitary landfill, 504 U.S. at 356.
ANN. § 299.41 3a.
" MicH. Com.. LAWS
69 Fort Gratioi Sanitary landfill, 504 U.S. at 361.
M Id.
7 The court reiterated its stand, slating that, "jthere is,however, no valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste that a landfill operator may accept
trom outside the State, but not the amount that the generator may accept from inside the State." Fort Gratiot Sanitary landfill, 504 U.S. at 367.
n OpE. REv, SAt. §§ 459A.1 10(1), (5) (1991).
n Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
n

id. at 1355.

n5

1d.01f1351-52.
Id. at 1352 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 758-59 (19811, and Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 20415 (1961) (other citations omitted).
'7 Empire Sanitary landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 645 A.2d 413, 418 (1994).
n0 Id,at 416 (citing Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act of July 28, 1988, Pub. L.No. 556, codified as 53 P.S. §§ 4000.101-.1904).
79 Empire Sanitary landfill, 645 A.2d at 416.
10 Id. at 418.
0 Id at 417. Another problem with the market participant allowance, although not addressed in this case, involves the monopoly prohibition. If the state can enter into
contracts and croft them to the state's specificalions, but cannot have a monopoly or control a substantial portion of a natural resource, the success it will enjoy in
protecting its interests will be limited. The state can use its bargaining power to control the flow of waste to the landfills it owns, but the other owners are free to manage
their landfills as they please. The state cannot step in and dictate the terms of other contracts, because itwill be deemed a market regulator.
76

MP
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Wisconsin's landfills.8 The court held
that the practical effect of the Wisconsin
statute was to control conduct occurring
wholly outside the borders of the state and
as such was a direct violation of the Commerce Clause."
The court stated that, even if the Wisconsin statute was not in direct violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause, its practical effect was impermissibly discriminatory
against out-of-state waste haulers. The
court reasoned that the statute warranted
heightened scrutiny because out-of-state
communities were forced to follow Wisconsin recycling practices regardless of
the merit of their own recycling programs
and because the waste generated in
those communities was no more dangerous than waste generated in Wisconsin."
The court rejected Wisconsin's argument that the statute constitutes the least
restrictive means of enforcing its prorecycling policies. The court explained
that because the Wisconsin statute was
subject to heightened scrutiny, Wisconsin
was required to show that its concerns
could not "be adequately served by nondiscriminatory altematives."" The statute
clearly indicated that if recyclable materials were separated and processed at a
materials recovery facility then the waste
would meet Wisconsin's environmental
needs.86 Because such a nondiscriminatory alternative existed, the statute could
not be justified under a heightened scrutiny standard.8
Regardless of whether the preceding
two arguments were available, the court
stated that the Wisconsin statute would
still fail the balancing test laid out in

Pike." Specifically, the court reasoned
that the burdens imposed on out-of-state
haulers for outweighed any realizable
benefits for Wisconsin." Furthermore, the
court staled that Wisconsin's interests
were not furthered by requiring out-of-state
communities to conform to Wisconsin recycling requirements." For these reasons
the court concluded that Wisconsin Statute
§159.07(3) violated the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution and was, therefore, invalid.

V. COvMENT
The Wisconsin statute has two important components. The first is waste containing any of eleven recyclable materials
may not be dumped in the state of Wisconsin. No objection was made to this
prohibition. The second part, and the
real problem, isthe exception to that general prohibition. Wisconsin will allow
loads of waste that contain the outlawed
materials to be dumped if the waste is
generated by a community that presorts its
recyclables. This exception appears to
serve as a safety-net for haulers. Wisconsin isaware that recycling at the curb is
not foolproof, and, thus, has allowed for
minor mistakes on the part of haulers.
Since Wisconsin is able to regulate the
disposal practices of its residents, it retains
a measure of control over how often the
exception is employed. Wisconsin can
enforce recycling at the curb, and greatly
reduce the amount of prohibited materials
dumped in its landfills.
For waste generated within Wisconsin, this exception presents no controversyhowever, waste coming from outside

82

Notional Solid Wastes Monogement Assn, 63 F.3d at 654.

*
*

Id. of 663.
Id. al 658.

Wisconsin's boarders is another matter.
The objection raised by NSWMA concems the measure of control over out-ofstate behavior the exception would give to
Wisconsin. The exception is predicated
on waste being generated in a community
which has a recycling program like Wisconsin's, and, thus, compels out-of-state
users of Wisconsin's landfills to implement
such a program in an out-of-state
community.
A. Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief justice Rehnquist has dissented in
every case argued before the Supreme
Court involving Commerce Clause challenges to state waste dumping regulations
from Philadelphia through Oregon Waste
Systems. His argument isa variation on
the quarantine exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause. Rehnquist stated that,
under the existing court position on quarantines, a state may dispose of infectious,
dangerous, or noxious materials produced
in the state as best it can, and forbid traffic of the same from out-of-state, even if the
materials are identical." So, a state can
make provisions to dispose of contagious
cattle resident to the state, and prohibit
importation of diseased cattle for disposal
at the same facilities. "The physical fact
of life that [a State] must somehow dispose of its own noxious items does not
mean that it must serve as a depository for
those of every other State."" He then applied this rationale to solid waste. just
because a State has noxious solid waste
of its own to dispose of, the Commerce
Clause does not inflict on the state the
duty to dispose of the some noxious solid

Governmeni Suppliers Consolidoling Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279(7th C. I 992).
Naional Solid Wastes Management Assn, 63 F.3d a 662.
07 Id. at 661. The court stated that requiring all waste entering the landIl to be treated ala recovery facility would fulfill Wisconsin's goals in a nondiscriminalory
way. Id. at 662. This would force on Wisconsin communities the added burden of a second screening of their waste, as Wisconsin towns were already required to
separate their refuse. In the alternative, Wisconsin could stop requiring its citizens to recycle and instead have alt the refuse treated at a reclamation facility. Bringing in
a "middleman" reclaimer to replace citizen sorting "at the curb" would greatly increases the cost of waste disposal Id.
n Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
" Notional Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 63 F.3d at 662-63.
* Id.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquisi, J., dissenting).
id.
*
"

162

The Commerce Clause and Flow-Control
waste produced from other states.'
Rehnquist noted that solid waste disposal regulations, like Michigan's," are
indistinguishable from the regulations Nebraska imposed on the exportation of water resources and which the court upheld
in Sporhose. The regulations apply
equally to instate and out-of-state consumers and are designed to protect against
excessive depletion of a natural resource.95 He stated that:
Commerce Clause concerns are
at their nadir when a state act
works in this fashion - raising
prices for all the State's consumers, and working to the substantial disadvantage of other
segments of the State's populolion - because in these circumstances 'a State's own political
processes will serve as a check
against unduly burdensome regulotions' . . . In sum, the low sim-

ply incorporates the common
sense notion that those responsible for a problem should be responsible for its solution to the
degree they are responsible for
the problem but no further.'
Rehnquist argued that requiring states to
accept out-of-state solid waste would force
states with low-cost available land to convert that land to landfills in order to cope
with the volume of incoming waste.97
That, Rehnquist insisted, is not what the
Commerce Clause isabout.
Rehnquist was joined in Philadelphia
by Chief Justice Burger, and in Fort Grotiot and Oregon Waste Systems by justice
Blackmun. With Burger and Blackmun
retiring, Rehnquist has lost his support for

this argument, and it isdifficult to imagine
Its this distinction on which Wisconsin
that he will be able to persuade the pre- can capitalize. National Solid Waste
sent court.
Management Association v. Meyer is the
first case that might provide compelling
B. Quarantines
proof that out-of-state waste issignificantly
The Supreme Court, in every case it different from Wisconsin waste. Wisconhas considered, has denied the argument sin has imposed upon its citizens stringent
that a State can ban importation of waste recycling and reclamation requirements.
because it poses a danger to the State. Provided these requirements are odeIn every case the court has considered, quately enforced, Wisconsin waste will
however, the waste in question has been be substantially "cleaner" than out-of-state
identical to waste produced and disposed waste that isgenerated in an environment
of instate. The court has left open the free of these regulations.
Wisconsin
question of whether different, more dan- waste will not contain the eleven forbidgerous waste, could be quarantined inthe den recyclable materials. In addition,
same way as diseased cattle or infected Wisconsin's available landfill space will
baitfish. In fact, the court has on numer- not be squandered and the health of its
ous occasions alluded to the fact that a citizens not endangered by noxious unregulation may get court approval if itcan separated waste coming from out-of-state.
be proven that the out-of-state waste someThe challenges to this argument are
how endangers or damages the state in a three-fold. The first is defnitional. Wisconsin will need to prove that this differway that instate waste does not. 98
In ruling out a quarantine designation ence between its waste and out-of-state
for the Alabama additional fee provision refuse is substantial enough to constitute a
the court cited Guy v. Baltimore, which different "kind" of waste. Second, it also
said, "in the exercise of its police. powers, will need to prove that the difference
a State may exclude from its territory, or makes the imported waste a danger to the
prohibit the sale therein of any articles health or safety of Wisconsin citizens.
which, in its judgment, fairy exercised, Third, it will need to prove that its interest
are prejudicial to the health or which in conserving landfill space is a compelendanger
lives or property of its ling one.
would
of0 insa.e
The the
cor4hs4e3.pnh
The more difficult problem Wisconsin
people.""O That case further stated that if
the regulation was of a like kind of prod- will face is convincing the court that there
uct that was distinct only in origin, the isno alternative, non-discriminatory means
regulation would not be allowed) 0 ' Fur- of achieving Wisconsin's end. InMaine,
ther, upon declaring that the Michigan the quarantine law was upheld because
law was not a quarantine law, the court out-of-state baitfish posed a danger instate
stated that the "conclusion would be differ- baitfish did not, and available inspection
ent if the imported waste raised health or techniques were not adequate to detect
other concerns not presented by Michigan the danger.' 03 An opponent to Wisconsin could easily argue that there are
waste."Ic1

Idomat
633.
t
Fort Groriot Santary landfill. 504 U.S. at 372.
95 in the case of solid waste disposal, the natural resource is an attractive and sa e environment." d. at 371.
remphsis
in the ouiginat).
6 Id., quoting Kasset v. Consolidated Freighdeiys Corp. of Del, 450 U.S. 662,675r119811
in the Commerce Ctause, however, that requires cheapland States to became the waste
a1
504 U.S. at 373. see no reason
97 Fort
Graoht Santary landih,
td.
repositories for their brethren, thereby suffering tho many risks that such sites present.
" The Newjersey law was found not to be a quarantine law because the waste was not damaging until after itentered the landfitt, and ot that point, itwas identtcal to
t'hewjewsey generated waste. Phitadeophia, 437 U.S. at 629.
99 100 U.S. 4341(1880).
04

101 td.
102

504 U.S. at 367.
Fart
Grqot Sonitafy
Maine, 477 U.S. at 15e1-52.
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alternative, less restrictive means to fulfill- prohibited recyclables prior to disposal
ing Wisconsin's goals, namely, reclamo- into the landfills. Here, again, the inspection statute would need to work evention and inspection.
handedly with regard to domestic and
foreign waste, as well as, satisfy the Pike
C. Reclamation and Inspection
Wisconsin could, as the court in this test. Instead of serving to discriminate
case suggested,'o require that all waste against out-of-state commerce by stopping
be treated at a reclamation facility before waste at the border, inspections would
entering the landfills, or that it be in- take place at the disposal site and, thus,
spected for the presence of the prohibited burden Wisconsin citizen haulers with the
articles. Mandatory treatment of waste at some requirements as non-citizen haulers.
reclamation facilities would ensure that This places it beyond the reach of strict
Wisconsin's goal of excluding recyclable scrutiny since such a statute would be neimaterials from its landfills is achieved. If ther facially discriminatory nor discriminathe requirement was imposed on domestic tory in effect.
Inorder to survive the balancing test in
and foreign waste alike, the even-handed
regulation would fall within an exception Pike, Wisconsin may need to limit inspecto the Commerce Clause and would be tions to random spot-checking. Stopping
upheld provided that it could pass the Pike and searching every load entering a landtest. Despite its probable judicial success, fill may so significantly slow the flow of
Wisconsin will not likely want to imple- commerce that itconstitutes an impermissiment this proposal because reclamation ble impediment or undue burden. If that
facilities are both expensive to operate burden is not outweighed by Wisconsin's
and maintain. If the State undertakes the interest in preserving landfill space and
operation itself, it faces enormous costs environmental cleanliness, the plan will be
which the citizens of Wisconsin must pay. held unconstitutional. Random sampling
If the State leaves reclamation to private of loods entering the landfill may reduce
companies, it must police those compa- this burden to permissible levels.
nies to ensure compliance, again, at a
high cost to Wisconsin taxpayers. These
D. Enforcement - Fines
are costs out-of-state haulers will not share,
Wisconsin still has an enforcement
and ones Wisconsin cannot easily pass problem. If it were allowed to inspect
on via a compensatory tax.
every lood, itwould be a simple matter to
Furthermore, because Wisconsin tax- turn back those inviolation of the ban. As
payers are already separating their a practical matter, however, turning back
waste, domestic waste would be sepo- a randomly chosen violator serves only to
rated twice, once at the curb and once at place it forther back in the line formed at
the reclamation facility. If Wisconsin resi- the disposal site. There isnothing to keep
dents were willing to shoulder the burden haulers from trying to sneak the same load
of curb-side recycling, evidenced by the through again as the odds of being ranadoption of this provision, there is little domly chosen on a second or third entry
likelihood that they will be willing to pay attempt plummet. There must be some
for someone else to do ita second time or form of deterrence to this type of action.
in their place.
Stiff fines may serve this purpose.
Another option open to Wisconsin is
Violations of the Resource Conservato require inspection of waste for tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) carry fines

of up to $25,000 per day the violation
remains uncorrected.io The possibility of
such severe fines acts as a fairly good incentive for companies to conform with
RCRA standards. A fine not to exceed
$25,000 for each of the eleven types of
prohibited recyclables found in a hauler's
load may be sufficient for Wisconsin's
purposes. That translates into a possible
fine of as much as $275,000 for a single
load.io Such severe penalties should
have a sufficiently deterring effect so that
no hauler would dare try to dispose of
prohibited wastes in Wisconsin landfills.
Alternatively, since fines are punitive in
nature, Wisconsin may want to require a
violator to forfeit a percentage of its company assets or revenues up to a legislotively set maximum. This would allow the
court to "fine until it hurts," and would allow a level that varies from company to
company. Both of these options leave the
court discretion to punish based on the
egregiousness of the offense or the number of violations.
Although statutorily imposed fines are
commonplace, fines have been challenged on Constitutional grounds, as violative of the Eighth Amendment. The
Eighth Amendment, although normally invoked in criminal cases to object to a penal sentence as being cruel or unusual,
also prohibits excessive boil and excessive fines in civil cases. Eigth Amendment
challenges to court-imposed civil fines,
however, have rarely been successful.
In Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railway. Co. v. Davis," the court gave
the standard for deciding when penalties
are excessive. Acceptable penalties are
"no more than reasonable and adequate
to accomplish the purpose of the law and
remedy the evil intended to be
reached."r'o The Supreme Court, in St.
Louis fron Mountain & Southern Railway
Co. v. Williams," expanded on the

'04 See supro note 44.
'"

42 U.S.C. § 69 28(g) (1988).

" 5HA ispermitted to impose a fine for every individual act or single course of action without violating its "egregious penalty policy." Secretary of labor v.
Cu..rpillar Inc., OSHRC, No. 87-0922 (Feb. 5, 1993). Itremains to be seen if this standard would be applied to ines for violations of Wisconsin's dumping laws and
ifthe presence of each of the kinds of prohibited recyclabtes would amount to separate acts or courses of action.

'" 170 S.W. 245 (1914).
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"reasonable and adequate" standard and
listed several factors to be considered
when judging a fine. When a fine "is
considered with due regard for the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the
need for securing uniform adherence . .
we think it properly cannot be said to be
so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
disproportioned to the offense or obviously
unreasonable.""o This standard leaves
the legislature with enormous latitude in
crafting fines and the courts with wide discretion in assessing them. In United States
v. Environmental Waste Control,"1 the
court gave guidelines for deciding the
magnitude of a fine. The court stated that
an Administrator must consider the seriousness of the violation and the efforts made
to comply with RCRA requirements in assessing a fine accompanying a RCRA violation.112 Finally, in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,'" the
court once again broadened the range of
acceptable fines, concluding that a fine
need only
bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm that is likely to occur
from the defendant's conduct as
well as to the harm that actually
has occurred. If the defendant's
actions caused or would likely
cause in a similar situation only
slight harm, the damages should
be relatively small. If the harm is
grievous, the damages should be
much greater." 4
With these restrictions in mind, the
fines imposed by Wisconsin law should
be calculated to reflect the grievousness of
the actual and potential harm to
0

Wisconsin's environment that would be
caused by the accelerated filling of its
landfills,"s the amount necessary to deter
potential violators, and the reasonable
relationship between the two.
Despite the Draconian nature of a rule
forbidding the dumping of recyclables
and the stiff fines associated with enforcing such a rule, Wisconsin should not be
reluctant to go forward with its plan for
fear of overburdening its own citizens.
Wisconsin has already shown its willingness to bear the burden of citizen refusesorting and has already adopted such a
rule. As a result, Wisconsin waste is already largely free of the prohibited items
so the likelihood of one of Wisconsin's
haulers being in violation should be relatively small. Furthermore, the threat of such
a fine might prove a useful incentive for
collectors and haulers to ensure that state
recycling requirements aimed at communities are being met. It would be to the
haulers advantage to enforce the state's
mandate of curb-side recycling so as to
avoid the risk of being penalized. Since
state enforcement will be reduced, on additional waste collection fee may be
needed. If Wisconsin citizens are required to pay collectors such a fee then it
should be returned to the citizens in the
form of state tax decreases.
The second benefit to Wisconsin citizens is the probable furtherance of the
State's original goal, not being forced to
dispose of out-of-state waste at all. Outofstate haulers will be forced to screen their
refuse meticulously before transporting it to
Wisconsin landfills, and will, therefore,
incur significant costs their Wisconsin
counterparts avoid through curb-side

recycling. Furthermore, ouof-state haulers
run the heightened risk of huge penalties
levied against them if they fail in this endeavor. Eventually, it may become more
cost effective for them to find other dumping grounds for their excess waste.

V.CONCLUSION
To date, states' efforts toward preserving landfill space have met with resistance
in the courts. This has largely been due to
the fact that states have directed their efforts on the transportation of out-of-state
waste into their borders for disposal. The
Commerce Clause has consistently defeated these attempts. Commerce Clause
exceptions have also not been useful in
securing states' aims. In order to avoid
violating the Commerce Clause, states
must focus their efforts away from the
transportation of waste into its borders.
Even-handed regulation seems the only
answer. While Wisconsin has enacted
an even-handed regulation, its enforcement policy has defeated it for the same
reasons import restrictions were struck
down: they singled out out-of-state commerce. A state that imposes random inspections and fines would work both as
an even-handed regulation and an evenhanded enforcement policy. As such, it
has a good chance of withstanding judicial scrutiny, provided the state complies
with the Pike balancing test and Eighth
Amendment requirements. Inthe end, the
answer to the states' environmental protection problems may lie in the willingness on
the part of its citizens to burden themselves
in order to ease the burden on their
environment.

Id. at 246.

10 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
110 id.at 670 lupholding a $200 judgement against
" 710 F.Supp. 1172 (19891.

railroad as not violative of Eighih Amendment; the actual damages were $1.32 plus $50 attorney's fees).

Id of 1242.
113 S. Ct. 2711, 2721 (1993), citing Gamesv. Fleming landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d, 897, 909(19911.
11 TXOProd.Corp., 113 S.C .at 2721.
'is The largest concerns were: 1)Wisconsin's present landfill space would be consumed by recyclable materials, 21 Wisconsin would be forced to forfet additionat
land to build new landfills, squandering Wisconsin's natural resources and inflicting on its citizens costs interms of loss of use of these lands and decrease invalue of
adjoining properties, 3)the dangers associated with landills would multiply with the increased number of landfills required, and 4) Wisconsin's air, land, and water
ecosystems would be adversely affected. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also For Graniot Landill, 504 U.S. at 373 (RehnquistJ.
dissenting).
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